Subrogation in Louisiana: Differences and Opportunities

Louisiana. Home of the Big Easy, Mardi Gras and drive-thru daiquiri bars. Louisiana is also home to a unique legal system called the civil code system, which the Pelican State inherited from French and Spanish settlers. Basically, a civil code legal system means that most of Louisiana law originates from codes and statutes, rather than from judge-made law (common law). For this reason, handling subrogation matters in Louisiana can present unique challenges, but it can also provide opportunities not found in common law states.

In general, I found that Louisiana law is more supportive of subrogation actions than common law jurisdictions. For example, a subrogated carrier may assert claims against a defendant for causes of loss that are not covered under the policy. See Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Kline, 454 So.2d 418, 419 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984). In Kline, the insured’s carport collapsed during high winds. Damages caused by high winds were covered under the insured’s policy. The subrogated insurer (that paid under the policy) sued the contractor that built the carport for construction defects. Defects in construction were not covered under the homeowner’s policy. The contractor-defendant asserted that the subrogated insurer did not have subrogation rights because the claims asserted in the petition were not covered losses under the homeowner’s policy. On appeal, the 3rd Circuit Court noted that the subrogation agreement assigned “all claims” to the insurer. The Court reasoned that the term “all claims” included all the claims that could have been asserted by insured against any potential defendant, including those claims not covered under the insurance policy. The Court returned the case to the trial court for a trial on the issue of causation (high winds or construction defects).

Another important difference in Louisiana is the general acceptance of subrogation rights arising from settling third-party liability claims. In general, Louisiana permits a liability insurance carrier to subrogate against a third-party tortfeasor after settling the plaintiff’s claims. Many times, this situation presents itself in environmental contamination or personal injury cases. In general, the settling plaintiff assigns his/her subrogation rights to the liability carrier through the settlement agreement and release, thereby granting the settling carrier conventional (contractual) subrogation rights.

While the vast majority of Louisiana law is conceptually the same as common law jurisdictions, a major difference is in the terminology. For example, a statute of limitations is referred to as “prescription,” and a statute of repose is referred to “peremption.” As I joked with my colleagues after obtaining my Louisiana bar license last year, the Louisiana bar should provide a Louisiana-to-common-law dictionary for those of us who started our practice at the common law.  Once the differences and opportunities in Louisiana are understood, as they say in Cajun country: Laissez les bon temps rouler—Let the good times roll.

New Report on CSST

A newly released study addresses the CSST failure scenario and suggests significant testing in an effort to “mitigate” it. The report, which is 267 pages is entitled, Validation of Installation Methods for CSST Gas Piping to Mitigate Lightning Related Damage. The report was issued by the Fire Protection Research Foundation, a group that consists of members of NFPA, the National Electrical Contractors Association, the U.S. Army, the New Mexico Institute of Technology, and three private engineering firms, among others. Significantly, the Sponsors of the study included numerous CSST manufacturers. Yet the report may not have been welcome news to the manufacturers, as it charges them with the need to conduct numerous tests in an effort to reduce the hazards of the product.

The report mentions by name the Cozen O’Connor CSST Task Force and highlights a number of cases handled by our attorneys. Several months ago, Angela Hahn, co-chair of the CSST Task Force, had a chance to share information with one of the Panel members of the Foundation, engineer Mitchell Guthrie, at the Lightning Protection System's Annual conference . She was joined by Mark Utke, who later met again with Mr. Guthrie to discuss at length the case of Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., a CSST failure case that Mark tried to verdict this past January.

As background, CSST stands for corrugated stainless steel tubing. It consists of a continuous, flexible stainless steel pipe corrugated in helical fashion to make it flexible. The exterior of CSST is typically coated with PVC or polyethylene (PE) that is yellow in color. The tubing walls of CSST are flexible and only approximately 10 mils thick (the equivalent of four sheets of paper), making CSST extremely vulnerable to damage in the event that energy from lightning should strike at or near a structure. The energy from a direct or indirect lightning strike will seek conductive materials to travel along and move toward ground. While seeking to go to ground and traveling the course of the CSST material, the energy can and does on occasion transfer or “jump” from the tubing. The transfer can occur when there is another metallic circuit, such as a chimney line, near the CSST, resulting in electrical arcing. The effect of an electrical arc is to create a hot plasma discharge and leave a hole. The combination of the high heat from the arcing event and the flow of gas through the resulting hole – both occurring at the same location -- will ignite the pressurized gas and causes a blow-torch effect, which can result in a significant fire.

The April 2011 CSST Report provides numerous examples of CSST failure scenarios and attempts to offer solutions, which it also calls “mitigations,” to address future CSST failure scenario. The Report cautions that merely bonding the CSST at its starting and/or ending point may not be sufficient and that “a global equipotential solution is necessary to achieve a complete solution.” The “mitigations” would include the following possibilities if supported by testing: multiple bonding, bonding with a short length of conductor, requiring minimum bends, requiring a separation distance from another metallic circuit (such as a chimney flue or cable), and a design change that would enhance the ability to withstand a lightning surge. The report notes that some manufacturers already include some of these requirements in their latest “installation rules.” But the report cautions: “However, based on some studied CSST cases, holes do not always occur where the distance between the CSST and a metallic part is the smallest, and thus separation distance may be difficult to address.” It also cautions that none of these potential solutions may actually work: testing is still needed to show that they will, in fact, work.

The recommended testing is summarized in the Conclusion section, as follows:

The scenario analysis, when compared to tests published so far (or simulations, should it be difficult to carry out some tests due to laboratory limitations when long lengths of CSST are required) have shown that some tests are missing. For the sake of clarity, we repeat below the main statements given in the scenario clause:
• Simulations are needed to show if separation distance is needed based on bonding conductor length and possible lightning currents given from the standard database. Bonding conductors located at the entrance may not be enough if the bonding conductors are too long. In that case, multiple bonding or separation distance may solve the problem (please note that a few cases have shown that incidents occurred in spite of apparent sufficient separation distance).
• Tests should be made to check the ability of CSST to withstand small fault current for a long time, as well as higher fault current for a shorter time.
It should be confirmed that multiple bonding is unlikely to create a major problem when surge current is flowing along CSST.
• Tests should be performed to identify the impedance (mainly inductance) of CSST per unit measure.
• Tests to determine CSST impedance should incorporate the maximum bending radius as given in technical brochures. The effect of bends should be investigated.
• Tests should be performed with 8/20 impulses (representing induced surges) to see if this can damage CSST if multiple bonding is not provided.
Based on tests results, it will be possible to determine if multiple bonding is necessary of not. The needed tests and simulations are described below. With four types of test, all scenarios can be covered.

Whether CSST manufacturers will follow the report’s recommendations and conduct the testing remains to be seen.  For additional information regarding CSST failures, please contact the author of this blog post.

Flash, KABOOM! Water Heater Failures Involving GAC's

 Lightning strikes and a water heater fails resulting in a fire. Is the subrogation investigation over? Not if the water heater failure involves a Gas Appliance Connector (GAC). GAC’s have properties similar to Corrugated Stainless Steel Tubing (CSST).

Recently, in a case tried by Cozen O’Connor, a jury imposed fault on a CSST manufacturer, finding that the CSST had failed during a lightning strike, causing a fire. CSST is used in gas distribution systems in residential and commercial construction. Lightning struck a home causing a leaking hole in the CSST igniting fuel, causing extensive damage. The jury determined that CSST was a defective product for which the manufacturer was strictly liable.

Similar to CSST, Gas Appliances Connectors (“GACs”) are pre-fabricated, similar in appearance and construction to CSST, with shorter runs. GACs service gas appliances such as furnaces, stoves, and water heaters. Like CSST, GACs can be subject to failure when impacted by errant electricity. The electrical current may result from a lightning strike, a failed air conditioning compressor, or other electrical anomalies such as energized or floating neutrals. The typical failure mechanism is an electrical arc and ‘blow out’ of the flared end of the GAC. 

The issue is whether a GAC is unreasonably dangerous given alternative, feasible designs. Although black iron pipe is an excellent alternative to CSST for gas distribution systems, it is not a good substitute for GACs given the difficulty in precisely lining up an appliance with the stub of a black pipe. Moreover, the GAC also functions to protect the gas system from leaks that might be caused by structural shifts in or vibrations to a black iron pipe system.


 

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Missing a few links in the chain of causation? Don't give up, you may not need them.

A fire occurs in a garbage can causing damage to a home. Joe and John Smith, construction workers installing hardwood flooring in the home on and prior to the date of the fire, admit that they smoke each day near the job site. They further admit that they typically extinguish and then discard their cigarettes in the same garbage can where the fire began, including doing so on the date it occurred. The garbage can itself is almost completely destroyed in the fire, and no trace of any cigarettes are found. No witnesses saw the fire begin, and nobody saw the Smiths discard a smoldering cigarette in the garbage can. Finally, no evidence can be shown to exclude the possibility that a third-party, as opposed to the Smiths, left a smoldering cigarette in this garbage can. Think these facts are insufficient to prove that Joe and John caused the fire in a civil case? You may be surprised.

The hypo given above describes the essential facts in the California Court of Appeals case of Garbell v. Conejo Hardwoods, Inc. (LC076832). The Second Appellate District in Garbell reaffirmed the established tenet of California law that Plaintiffs in civil cases do not need to prove causation with absolute certainty, but rather only need to show that their theory is probable given the evidence at hand. In reaffirming this principle, the Garbell court rejected the Defendant's contention that expert testimony was required to establish every link in the chain of causation, and instead held the expert investigator's process of elimination based analysis to be sufficient.

The fire investigator in Garbell concluded that the fire began in the garbage can and eliminated all causes of the fire except for a smoldering discarded cigarette or spontaneous combustion. The court directed a verdict in favor of the defense on the spontaneous combustion theory, leaving the jury only the discarded cigarette theory of causation to consider. Since the investigator could not testify if it was more likely than not that the smoldering cigarette belonged to one of the Defendant's workers rather than some other third-party, the defense argued that there was insufficient evidence that the Defendant was responsible. The jury disagreed by ruling for the Plaintiff, and the court upheld the jury's finding permitting the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence that the Defendant was to blame.

The end result of this case provides two valuable lessons. First, the next time you can't affirmatively prove causation, don’t be dismayed, a process of elimination based analysis may be sufficient to prove your theory. Second and equally important, expert testimony, such as the fire investigator's above, is substantially more likely to be admissible in courts (such as in California state court) following the Kelly/Frye "general acceptance test" governing the admissibility of expert opinions, as opposed to Daubert (followed in federal court and in some states) whereby the test for admissibility of expert opinions is much more stringent. It is unlikely that the investigator's process of elimination based analysis in Garbell was tested or peer-reviewed, which are both significant factors that would be considered in determining the admissibility of this testimony under Daubert, unlike under the applicable Kelly/Frye standard where the theory must only be shown to be generally accepted in the particular field. Therefore, it's always important to analyze the expert opinions needed to establish your case in weighing whether to file in a court following Daubert as opposed to Kelly/Frye, as a court applying Daubert just might require your expert to prove those additional missing links in the chain.
 

Inverse Condemnation Alive and Well in Oregon

In February 2011, the Oregon Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the doctrine of "inverse condemnation" is alive and well in Oregon. Inverse condemnation claims do not require a showing of negligence, and instead arise by showing that a government actor (e.g. a city) “substantially interfered” with an owner’s right to use his or her property, and that therefore the owner is owed “just compensation” under the Constitution (in this case, Article I, Section 18 of the Oregon Constitution—the “Takings Clause”). The case, Dunn v. City of Milwaukie (CV07040247), stemmed from property damage caused when a municipal sewer system backed-up into a home. The City, at the time, had been “hydrocleaning” a nearby sewer (blasting high-pressure water from a tanker), allegedly causing the backup. While this cleaning was taking place, sewer water shot from bathroom fixtures into the home and caused substantial property damage throughout.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's $55,000 award based on the homeowner's inverse condemnation claim. In its decision, the Dunn Court rejected arguments from the City that it did not "intend" to harm the plaintiff, and that since the damage was repairable, that there was no "substantial interference" with the homeowner’s property rights. The Dunn case is a recent reminder of the subrogation opportunities that may arise in property damage cases stemming from government work or municipal systems. Even where a case does not involve negligent work performed by a municipality (or other government actor), a subrogating carrier may still pursue a recovery case if it can demonstrate that the government impeded its insured’s property rights.
 

The Georgia Statute of Repose for Products: When Does Time Begin to Run?

Georgia has a statute of repose for claims involving defective products. O.C.G.A. §51-11-11(b)(2) states that “no action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.” [Emphasis Added]  Prior to 2006, based upon this statute, products claims were brought against product manufacturers within ten (10) years after the product was purchased by the first consumer or user. However, in 2006 the ruling in Johnson v. Ford Motor Company changed the game. In Johnson, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a claim involving damage caused by a product’s component part must be filed within 10 years after the part was incorporated into the final design of the product by the manufacturer.

In Johnson, the plaintiff suffered property damage when her Lincoln Town Car erupted into flames inside of her neighbor’s garage. The fire spread from the neighbor’s home to the plaintiff’s home. The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle’s speed control deactivation switch failed and caused the fire. The plaintiff sued the vehicle and the switch manufacturers to recover the damage to her property. The Court upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturers and held that the 10 year statute of repose began to run “when Ford installed the switch in the car and the car became operable.” The Court reasoned that “when the car was driven off the assembly line, the starter had been actively placed in use, was in fact being used, and did not require purchase from the end user or consumer to be used for its “intended purpose.”

On February 7, 2011, the Georgia Supreme Court issued a ruling resolving the controversial issue raised in the Johnson case. See Campbell v. Altec Industries Inc., 288 Ga. 535 (2011). In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the Georgia Supreme Court: “In a strict liability or negligence action, does the statute of repose in O.C.G.A § 51-1-11 begin running when (1) a component part causing an injury is assembled or tested, (2) a finished product, which includes an injuring component part, is assembled, or (3) a finished product, which includes an injuring component part, is delivered to its initial purchaser?”

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Texas Tort Reform 2011: Back So Soon?

Don't look now, but the Texas Legislature may be back up to its old tricks. That's right, "tort reform" has once again become a hot topic in Texas. On March 14, 2011, two separate bills were introduced in the state Senate and the state house of Representatives that could fundamentally alter civil litigation in Texas (yet again). The bills (referred to as S.B. 13 and H.B. 274, respectively) effectively creates a "loser pays" system to address what the legislature believes to a continuing "lawsuit crisis" in Texas. Governor Rick Perry has expressed his support of a loser pays tort reform initiative, and has publicly commented that he is fully committed to ensuring that the bills make their way through the legislative process.

Essentially, the bills would make the losing party - and in one of the bills, the losing lawyer - responsible for paying the prevailing party's attorneys' fees and litigation costs. However, the bills approach this issue in different ways. Specifically, S.B. 13 allows a "prevailing party" to recovery attorneys' fees in lawsuits for services, labor and materials; lost or damaged freight; killed or injured stock; contract claims and defamation actions. The bill further provides that a winning plaintiff shall pay litigation costs if the plaintiff refuses a settlement offer, a judgment is ultimately signed by the court and the amount of monetary relief in the judgment is more favorable to the defendant who made the settlement offer than the actual settlement offer itself. S.B. 13 also commissions a study to be conducted by the Texas Supreme Court to determine the most effective manner to implement a "loser pays" system. Under S.B. 13, the Texas Supreme Court would be required to report its findings to the legislature by 2012.

H.B. 274 contains similar language to S.B. 13, but also allows for attorney liability for litigation costs. Specifically, the bill would permit the trier of fact to determine whether the civil action prosecuted by a claimant was "an abusive civil action," or "a civil action that a reasonable person would conclude is an abuse of the civil justice process." If the trier of fact answered in the affirmative, the attorney would be individually responsible for his opponent's litigation costs which would include "reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, reasonable and necessary travel expenses, reasonable fees for not more than two testifying expert witnesses and court costs." The bills also contain provisions for early dismissal of frivolous lawsuits, ensuring that new causes of action are not created unless expressly established by the legislature and speedier trials with reduced discovery for claims under $100,000.00.

Obviously many of the provisions could adversely affect subrogation claims and counsel who handle such claims. Fortunately, plaintiffs and subrogated carriers have an unlikely ally for this round of potential tort reform: civil defense lawyers. A recent article in "Texas Lawyer" noted comments from several prominent defense attorneys who are concerned with "the integrity of the civil justice system." These lawyers publicly noted that extreme measures in tort reform fundamentally affect overall fairness in the legal system and could ultimately cause the system to "collapse on itself." Moreover, Texas already has similar laws which allow defendants to recover attorney's fees making the new bills somewhat redundant.

As with any major legislative initiative that affects the rights of subrogated carriers, the Texas offices of Cozen O'Connor will continue to monitor and provide periodic updates regarding the progress of both bills.