Limitation Periods for Property Damage Losses in Canada

What is a Limitation Period?

All legal proceedings, including subrogated recovery actions, must be commenced within a certain period of time set out by legislation. The time period in which an action can be brought is called a limitation period. It is also sometimes called a prescription period. If an action is not brought within the applicable limitation period, the claim will be forever lost. Even the most meritorious subrogated claim will disappear because of the expiry of a limitation period.

What is the Purpose of a Limitation Period?

The essential purpose of a limitation period is to place a reasonable limit on the amount of time which a party may take to commence an action. This serves a number of important purposes:

• It creates an incentive for plaintiffs to bring their lawsuits in a timely fashion.
• It defines a period of time in which a defendant can know with certainty that it will be free of ancient obligations.
• It prevents plaintiffs from bringing old claims in which evidence has been lost by the passage of time

When Does a Limitation Period Start to Run?

Each province has different rules about when a limitation period begins to run. For example, in some provinces, time will start to run as soon as the facts which give rise to the claim take place. In other cases, the limitation period may not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers that he or she has been wronged. In some cases, a limitation period may temporarily stop running while parties are attempting to reach a settlement agreement. A party’s conduct may also affect the running of a limitation period. Additionally, where a plaintiff is a minor or under a disability, the limitation period may not start to run until after that person reaches the age of majority or is represented by a litigation guardian.
 

Which Limitation Period Applies?

The limitation period that applies in a particular case is determined by a number of factors. Just as limitation periods vary from province to province, they may also vary depending on the nature of the subrogated claim or cause of action, or the subject matter of the claim. Furthermore, some actions are dealt with by federal law in which case there may be one single limitation period that applies across Canada. Limitation periods may also vary depending upon the identity of the party being sued. For example, different limitation periods may apply if an action is brought against a municipality or other government body. The applicable limitation period may also be affected by the identity of the plaintiff, for example, where the plaintiff is a minor or under a disability. Finally, in some provinces, but not all of them, parties can agree to a different limitation period than is set out in the legislation.

You will also notice that some provinces have a maximum time period, called an “ultimate limitation period”, after which time the claim will be barred, even if the person did not ever become aware of the circumstances giving rise to the claim. The ultimate limitation may be particularly significant in claims arising out of faulty construction or environmental contamination where a defendant’s wrongful conduct may often not be discovered for long periods of time The following is intended as an educational overview of some of the general limitation periods that will apply in claims for property losses in Canada:

(NOTE: Depending on the circumstances, different limitation periods may apply, or additional notice requirements may be applicable. For example, claims involving assaults or intentional acts, claims against municipalities, claims against medical professionals may be subject to additional notice requirements AND shorter limitation periods. The type of claim, the type of property at issue, the capacity of the claimant and the type of relief being sought may be all be relevant to determine which limitation period applies. For this reason alone, you should always seek legal advice specific to your circumstances).

ALBERTA
• General Limitation Period - 2 years commencing when the cause of action is discovered. Limitations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12, s. 3(1)(a).
• Ultimate Limitation Period – 10 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12, ss. 3(1)(b)

BRITISH COLUMBIA
• General Limitation Period – 2 years commencing when the cause of action is discovered. Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, ss. 3(2), 6.
• Ultimate Limitation Period - 30 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.266, s. 8(1).

MANITOBA
• General Limitation Period - 2 years for injury to chattels and 6 years for injury to real property commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitation of Actions Act, C.C.S.M. c. L150, s. 2(1)(g).However, a court can grant leave to continue or begin an action if not more than 12 months have elapsed between date the action was “discovered” and date of application for leave, subject to ultimate limitation period. Limitation of Actions Act, C.C.S.M. c. L150, s. 14(1).
• Ultimate Limitation Period - 30 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitation of Actions Act, C.C.S.M. c. L150, s.14(4).

NEW BRUNSWICK
• As of May 1, 2010, there is a general limitation period of 2 years, and an ultimate limitation period of 15 years. Limitation of Actions Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. L-8.5.

NFLD. & LABRADOR
• General Limitation Period – 2 years commencing when the cause of action is discovered. Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1, ss. 5(b); 13; 14.
• Ultimate Limitation Period - 10 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1, s. 14 (3).

N.W.T.
• General Limitation Period – 6 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-8, s. 2(e)

NOVA SCOTIA
• General Limitation Period - 6 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.258, s. 2(1)(e). However, within 4 years of expiry of general limitation period, court may disallow the limitation period, having regard to circumstances of the case – Listed are enumerated factors to consider including date of “discovery” of claim, Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.258, s. 3.
• Important Note: A 2009 version of this Act has received royal assent but has not yet been proclaimed in force.

NUNAVUT
• General Limitation Period – 6 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8, s. 2(e).

ONTARIO
• General Limitation Period – 2 years commencing when the cause of action is discovered. Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2004, c. 31, ss. 4,5.
• Ultimate Limitation Period – 15 years (commencing from 2004 or when the cause of action arises, whichever is later). Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2004, c. 31, s. 15.

P.E.I.
• General Limitation Period – 6 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Statute of Limitations, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-7, s. 2(1)(g),

QUEBEC
• General Limitation Period – 3 years from time the right of action arises. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2925.
• Claims against municipalities may be subject to a 15 day notice period and a 6 month limitation period. Municipal Code of Quebec, R.S.Q. c. 27.1, art. 11112.1

SASKATCHEWAN
• General Limitation Period – 2 years commencing when the cause of action arises. Limitations Act, S.S. 2004, c. L-16.1.
• (NOTE: If it’s an action against a city, there is a 1 year limitation period to both file AND serve the claim).
• Ultimate Limitation Period – 15 years. Limitations Act, S.S. 2004, c. L-16.1.

YUKON
• General Limitation Period – 6 years commencing when cause of action arises. Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 139, s. 2(1)(e), (f)

Conclusion

Although it is important for subrogation professionals to be alert to some of the limitation periods which might commonly apply in property damage claims, the limitation period which finally applies in a given case can be a complex and difficult legal issue to determine and may require resort to both legislation and case law. Oftentimes, the seemingly obvious limitation period is not the correct one and in some cases, the correct limitation period may even be difficult for lawyers to identify or locate. The opinion of an experienced lawyer should always be obtained in order to ensure that a subrogated claim is not unintentionally forsaken.
 

Ontario Court Clarifies Carriage of Action Disputes

In Zurich v. Ison T.H. Auto Sales, 2011 ONSC 1870, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was faced with a dispute between an insurer and insured over who had control over a recovery action. The loss arose from an explosion and fire that occurred at an apartment building. The insured, an automobile dealer, was storing 71 new cars in rented space in the underground parking lot of the building. The cars were damaged and could not be sold as new. The insured made a claim under its policy and was paid approximately $1.9 million. This represented the factory invoice price of the vehicles, less a deductible of $10,000. The insurer was subsequently able to recover about $900,000 in salvage for the cars, so it had a net subrogated claim of about $1 million. In addition, the insured claimed that it had suffered a loss of profits as a result of the damage to the cars – namely, the difference between the manufacturer’s price and the price at which the vehicles could be sold to customers. As well, the insured lost the ability to service the 71 new automobiles and the opportunity to resell trade-ins on those vehicles. It also claimed a loss of goodwill. The insured then commenced an action and included the insurer's subrogated portion. The insurer did not commence its own action. Shortly prior to discoveries commencing in the insured's action, the insurer appointed its own lawyers and asked to be added as counsel of record. The insured denied this request, and the insurer then brought an application seeking carriage and control over the action.

The Court examined the subrogation clause in the policy, which stated the insurer’s subrogation right arose on making any payment or on assuming liability to make payment. The insurer argued that the clause overrode the common law rule that the insurer does not have control over the action until the insured has been fully indemnified. The Court agreed that the clause altered the common law by allowing the insurer to subrogate prior to fully paying the loss, and permitted the insurer to share the amount recovered with the insured, on a pro rata basis, where there has been less than a full recovery. However, the clause was silent on who had control over the action. There was no reason to imply a provision giving the insurer the right of control in order to give business efficacy to the contract. Further, the effect of the clause, including the right of the insurer to share proportionately in recoveries, coupled with the duty of good faith, required the insured, although in control of the litigation, to consider the insurer’s interests, to keep the insurer informed concerning the status of the litigation and concerning major issues in the litigation, and to consult with the insurer with respect to the prosecution of the litigation. Thus, the Court ruled in favour of the insured and dismissed the application. Of note, the Court also considered the fact that the insured had been diligent in advancing the claim, the action was well advanced, the insurer had waited a year and half before discussing subrogation with the insured, and the lack of any prejudice by leaving carriage with the insured. However, the Court did state that there may be cases where the insurer’s interest is so vastly disproportionate to the insured’s interest that it would be unreasonable to allow the latter to have control of the litigation (this did not apply in the present case as the insured's claim was $700K and the insurer's claim was $1M).

Zurich v. Ison T.H. Auto Sales clarifies the impact of subrogation wording commonly used by insurers and thought, based on obiter dicta by the Supreme Court of Canada, to afford the insurer control over an action prior to full indemnity by the insured. In the wake of Zurich v. Ison T.H. Auto Sales, insurers should be diligent in appointing subrogation counsel at the earliest opportunity. This will allow the parties the opportunity to enter into joint recovery agreements, and at a minimum document at an early stage the insurer's desire to pursue its subrogated claim. Thought should also be given by underwriters to expressly provide for the insurer's control over subrogation in cases of partial indemnity, as it is clear the Court is unwilling to imply such a right.
 

Waiver of Subrogation, a Canadian Perspective

You have a fire loss at a commercial premise, and the insured's tenant is clearly at fault for the same. Is there subrogation?  Not so fast, preparing that demand or settlement brief may be premature as there may be language in the lease precluding subrogation against the tenant. In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada set forth the legal principles which may act to bar a subrogated claim in the context of a commercial tenancy. In Cummer-Yonge Investments Ltd. v. Agnew Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 221 and Smith v. T. Eaton Co., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 749, the subject leases contained a covenant from the landlord to insure the property against loss from fire. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the covenant established that the landlord had intended to eliminate any right of action against the tenant. Since the insurer is in no better position than the insured as against the third party, the subrogated claim was dismissed. In Ross Southwood Tire Ltd. v. Pyrotech Products Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 35, the lease required the tenant to pay part of the cost of the property insurance secured by the landlord. The Supreme Court of Canada held that since the tenant contributed to the cost of the policy, the landlord and tenant were essentially joint insureds and the subrogated claim could not proceed.

The above cases demonstrate that it is critical to review the underlying lease prior to advancing the claim. Although the presence of a covenant to insure or contribute to insurance may result to bar the claim, the existence of the same only creates an inference of a waiver of subrogation which may be rebutted based on the wording contained in the other parts of the lease.  For instance, the following factors may assist in a finding against a waiver:
 

- a mere agreement to insure versus an actual covenant to insure

- the loss may not have been a peril sought to be covered under the subject policy

- deductibles or self insured retentions may not be barred

- the requirement of a cross liability clause in the tenant's liability policy

- an express versus an implied covenant

- the existence of an "entire agreement clause" in the lease

 

The above list is not exhaustive but illustrates that there are several factors which the Canadian courts may consider in determining whether a bar to subrogation exists. An early review of the lease ensures that time and costs are not needlessly expended on a clearly barred claim.

Subrogation Rights Under A Standard Mortgage Clause In Canada

A. What is A Standard Mortgage Clause?

First-party property insurance policies usually contain one of two types of mortgagee clauses: i) a loss-payable clause; or ii) a standard mortgage clause.

i)          The Loss-Payable Clause: This type of clause merely provides that insurance proceeds shall be paid to a mortgagee as "its interests may appear." Under a loss-payable clause, a mortgagee's right to recovery is dependent upon the insured mortgagor's compliance with policy obligations. That is to say, a mortgagee has no better position than the insured (mortgagor) to recover under the policy and is therefore subject to any act, neglect, omission or misrepresentation of the insured which might void or breach coverage under the policy. 

 ii)       The Standard Mortgage Clause: The Standard Mortgage Clause is the standard vehicle by which mortgagees insure their interest in encumbered property. The standard mortgage clause was incorporated into policies because the “loss payable” clause did not adequately protect the mortgagee’s interest in the insured property. Under the standard mortgage clause, a mortgagee is entitled to direct payment for a loss to the extent of its interest at the time of the loss, independent of whether the named insured mortgagor has complied with its policy obligations. Once the mortgagee has been paid for a loss to the extent of its full interest in the property, the insured mortgagor is entitled to payment for the remainder of the amount of loss, if any.

B. A Standard Mortgage Clause is an Independent Contract

A policy that contains a Standard Mortgage Clause contains, in essence, two contracts:

(1) a contract between the insurer and the insured mortgagor (such as a homeowner), and

(2) a contract between the insurer and the mortgagee (for example, a bank).

The separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee remains in force even when the policy itself has been voided by an act, neglect, omission or misrepresentation attributable to the mortgagor, owner or occupant of the property. Thus, when the insured mortgagor voids the policy, for example, by doing something that materially changes the policy risk, the Standard Mortgage Clause protects the mortgagee by maintaining the insurance of the mortgagee’s interest in force. The insurer must pay the mortgagee’s loss to the extent of the policy limits even when the mortgagor has voided the policy.

C. Example of a Standard Mortgage Clause

The Standard Mortgage Clause, as approved by the Insurance Bureau of Canada, has two parts:

IT IS HEREBY PROVIDED AND AGREED THAT:

1. BREACH OF CONDITIONS BY MORTGAGOR, OWNER OR OCCUPANT

This insurance and every documented renewal thereof – AS TO THE INTEREST OF THE MORTGAGEE ONLY THEREIN – is and shall be in force notwithstanding any act, neglect, omission or misrepresentation attributable to the mortgagor, owner or occupant of the property insured, including transfer of interest, any vacancy or non-occupancy, or the occupation of the property for purposes more hazardous than specified in the description of the risk;

PROVIDED ALWAYS that the mortgagee shall notify forthwith the Insurer (if known) of any vacancy or non-occupancy extending beyond thirty (30) consecutive days, or of any transfer of interest or increased hazard (not permitted by the policy) shall be paid for by the Mortgagee – on reasonable demand – from the date such hazard existed, according to the established scale of rates for the acceptance of such increased hazard, during the continuance of this insurance.

2. RIGHT OF SUBROGATION

Whenever the Insurer pays the Mortgagee any loss award under this policy and claims that – as to the Mortgagor or Owner – no liability therefore existed, it shall be legally subrogated to all rights of the Mortgagee against the Insured; but any subrogation shall be limited to the amount of such loss payment and shall be subordinate and subject to the basic right of the Mortgagee to recover the full amount of its mortgage equity and in priority to the Insurer; or the Insurer may at its option pay the Mortgagee all amounts due or to become due under the mortgage or on the security thereof, and shall thereupon receive a full assignment and transfer of the mortgage together with all securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt.

SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS MORTGAGE CLAUSE (and these shall supersede any policy provision in conflict therewith BUT ONLY AS TO THE INTEREST OF THE MORTGAGEE), loss under this policy is made payable to the Mortgagee.

As you can see above, the first part of the Clause contains the language that provides that the policy remains in force as to the interest of the mortgagee despite any act, omission or misrepresentation of the mortgagor or any change in use that increases the risk.

The second part of the Clause provides that when its requirements are met, the insurer becomes legally subrogated to all the rights of the mortgagee against the insured to the extent of the payment it has made to the mortgagee.

D.  Can an insurer exercise its right of subrogation against an insured mortgagor under a standard mortgage clause without establishing that a policy is void?  

On a literal reading, the subrogation portion of the standard mortgage clause appears to suggest that an insurance company can simply allege that coverage has been vitiated by the insured mortgagor in order to exercise these subrogation rights. Thus, the question arises; can an insurer exercise its right of subrogation against an insured mortgagor under a standard mortgage clause without having to prove that the policy coverage has been vitiated?

Surprisingly, this question had received little judicial consideration in Canada until the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision of Farmers’ Mutual Insurance Company (Lindsay) v. Pinder, 2009 ONCA 831 (CanLII).

A fire occurred at the home of Joyce and Cindy Pinder. Their insurance company denied coverage, alleging that there had been a material change in risk with respect to the installation of a new heating system, and that the Pinders had made willfully false statements regarding their contents claim. The Pinders sued their insurance company seeking a declaration that they were entitled to coverage.

The house was subject to a mortgage with the Bank of Montreal for which the insurance company paid $97,143.97 under a Standard Mortgage Clause.  Upon making the payment, the insurance company then commenced a subrogated action against the Pinders seeking summary judgment for the $97,143 that it paid the bank on the mortgage. The Pinders argued that since the issue of whether their policy was void had yet to be resolved, the Bank had not yet acquired the right of subrogation under the Standard Mortgage Clause.

The Court of Appeal clarified that:

1. First, the insurer must actually make a payment to the mortgagee for its loss. This condition was satisfied when the insurance company paid the bank $97,143.97.

2.  Second, the insurer must establish a claim that it has no liability to the insured mortgagor. In other words, before the insurance company could exercise the right of subrogation under the standard mortgage clause, it had to prove that the Pinders had vitiated coverage under the policy.  This was an issue that would require a trial and so could not be addressed on the insurance company’s summary judgment motion.

Accordingly, the Court held that the issue of whether the insurance company had a right of subrogation under the Standard Mortgage Clause would have to wait until a resolution of the Pinder’s coverage action. The Court ordered that the two actions be tried together.

Canadian law still requires that subrogated actions be brought in the name of the insured rather than insurer

Automobile Accident In Canada, the right of subrogation is a product of the common law, although it may be modified by statute or contract. Unlike in the United States, Canadian common law provides that an insurer may sue only in the name of the insured in relation to a subrogated claim .That rationale has its roots in the need to provide a process by which the insurer would be able to exercise its subrogated rights. Historically, insureds were required to take all steps within their power to reduce a loss for which they had received indemnity, including exercising legal remedies against third parties. Since those remedies were personal to the insured, however, they could only be exercised in the name of the insured as a matter of procedural law. The common law did not provide a method whereby a person could be compelled to commence an action against another; therefore insurers had to apply to the Chancery Court to compel an insured to allow his or her name to be used for legal proceedings against third persons in order to reduce the loss.

The tenet still holds true today, and is illustrated by an exception to the rule discussed in the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Freudmann-Cohen v. Tran, 2004 CanLII 34765 (Ont. C.A.) . In Freudmann-Cohen, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when her car was struck by another vehicle. Since the driver of the offending vehicle was underinsured, the plaintiff asserted a claim under her own automobile insurer for underinsured motorist coverage. Her insurer, Zurich, subsequently learned that the defendant had been delivering pizza for Pizza Nova franchise at the time of the accident and that the franchisee had insurance coverage. It then issued a third party claim in its own name against the defendant pursuant to Rule 29.01 of Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that: "A defendant may commence a third party claim against any person who is not a party to the action and who...should be bound by the determination of an issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant." Zurich argued that Rule 29.01 constitutes a procedural scheme, with the force of regulation, which overrides the normal subrogation principle requiring an insurer claiming a subrogated right to sue in the name of the insured in circumstances such as these.

The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed, and held that the subrogation principle obliging the insurer to sue in the name of the insured is a procedural requirement itself, as opposed to a substantive obligation. While subrogation is a matter of substance rather than form, this aspect of subrogation is a matter of the procedure to be followed in the exercise of the substantive right of subrogation. The court noted however that:

"[t]he fact that Zurich has resorted to the third party procedure to put its subrogated claim on behalf of the plaintiffs in play in the action does not mean that Zurich is asserting the plaintiffs’ claim against Pizza Nova in Zurich’s own name. As I have earlier pointed out, rule 29.01 merely provides a mechanism whereby the defendant Zurich may ensure that an issue regarding which the third party should be bound is determined in the action; it is not necessary that that issue arise out of a claim whereby the defendant says the third party is or may be liable to the defendant. In my view, Zurich is entitled to resort to the third party rule in its own name in these circumstances."

As this case demonstrates, the right of an insurer to bring a subrogated action is derivative; that is, it merely a right to make such claim for damages as the insured himself could have made. For this reason, the general rule still holds in Canada that a subrogated action must be brought in the insured's name, rather than that of the insurer.