Subrogation & Recovery Law Blog : Insurance Subrogation Lawyer & Attorney : Cozen O'Connor Law Firm : Property Damage & Insurance Commentary

“Dangerous and generally a fruitless occupation.”- Justice Akenhead

No, Justice Akenhead was not talking about being a lawyer, but stating that it is inappropriate to rank possible causes of a fire in terms of probability in order to select the most probable. 

In Fosse Motor Engineers Ltd v Conde Nast (2008), Fosse, the owner of a warehouse, asserted negligence against its tenant and an employment agency that supplied workers in the building for that tenant. A fire occurred at the warehouse when only the workers and a security guard were present. Expert evidence could not identify which of several possible causes led to the fire. The possible causes were: a cigarette discarded by either Fosse’s employees or the agency workers; an electrical fault; or arson by an intruder. Fosse claimed the fire was caused by one of the agency workers carelessly discarding a cigarette or, if it was an intruder, because a door had been left open by the agency workers allowing the intruder access.

The Judge held that although the Court might eliminate all but one of the causes of the fire, it still had to decide that the remaining cause was the most probable. The judge accepted the evidence of the agency workers that the fire was not caused by their actions and discounted the electrical cause as being improbable. That left either someone working earlier or an intruder (entering before the agency workers). The Judge found that as it was not possible, on the balance of probabilities, to determine which of the two remaining feasible scenarios was the cause, Fosse had failed to prove its case.

What’s all the Fosse about?

Fosse provides a reminder that in England & Wales the burden rests upon the claimant to overcome the evidential burden. In some respects the fact that the Judge did not choose to decide between (what he regarded as) the remaining feasible causes was academic since, in either scenario, Fosse would not have been successful. However, the fact that the Judge chose not to decide may be useful in defending claims where the exact circumstances that gave rise to the allegation are unclear: It is therefore always worthwhile looking into causation issues with a critical eye. 

In Drake v Harbour (2008), the lack of proof of an exact cause did not prevent recovery. The claimant engaged the defendant electrician to rewire her home. She was away from the property during the work when a fire started in the loft where Harbour had been working. The Court of Appeal held that the fact that the claimant was unable to demonstrate the precise mechanism that led to the fire was not a bar to recovery; if a claimant proved that a defendant was negligent and a loss was caused that was of a kind likely to have resulted from such negligence, that would ordinarily be enough to infer that it was probably so caused. Further, as Harbour was suggesting that it was not his negligence that caused the fire, then it was his burden to suggest what the probable cause was, and to properly plead it.

Harbouring doubts?

Drake suggests that where negligence can be established you do not necessarily have to show the precise mechanism as an English Court might infer that it was the defendant's negligence that caused the loss; the onus then shifting to the defendant to prove that alternative causes are at least “as likely”.

Causation considerations
These two cases highlight the importance of considering the cogency of the factual (and expert) evidence in proceedings. Drake suggests that even if you don't know the precise mechanism, if you can show that the likely causes all would have emanated from the negligence of a specified person, that suffices. If an English Court can be satisfied that a party was negligent it may not always be necessary to show the most likely cause. In Fosse, though, because the causes may have had different culprits, and because negligence could not necessarily be shown, the causation hurdle could not be overcome.

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In Canada, the right of subrogation is a product of the common law, although it may be modified by statute or contract. Unlike in the United States, Canadian common law provides that an insurer may sue only in the name of the insured in relation to a subrogated claim .That rationale has its roots in the need to provide a process by which the insurer would be able to exercise its subrogated rights. Historically, insureds were required to take all steps within their power to reduce a loss for which they had received indemnity, including exercising legal remedies against third parties. Since those remedies were personal to the insured, however, they could only be exercised in the name of the insured as a matter of procedural law. The common law did not provide a method whereby a person could be compelled to commence an action against another; therefore insurers had to apply to the Chancery Court to compel an insured to allow his or her name to be used for legal proceedings against third persons in order to reduce the loss.

The tenet still holds true today, and is illustrated by an exception to the rule discussed in the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Freudmann-Cohen v. Tran, 2004 CanLII 34765 (Ont. C.A.) . In Freudmann-Cohen, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when her car was struck by another vehicle. Since the driver of the offending vehicle was underinsured, the plaintiff asserted a claim under her own automobile insurer for underinsured motorist coverage. Her insurer, Zurich, subsequently learned that the defendant had been delivering pizza for Pizza Nova franchise at the time of the accident and that the franchisee had insurance coverage. It then issued a third party claim in its own name against the defendant pursuant to Rule 29.01 of Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that: "A defendant may commence a third party claim against any person who is not a party to the action and who...should be bound by the determination of an issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant." Zurich argued that Rule 29.01 constitutes a procedural scheme, with the force of regulation, which overrides the normal subrogation principle requiring an insurer claiming a subrogated right to sue in the name of the insured in circumstances such as these.

The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed, and held that the subrogation principle obliging the insurer to sue in the name of the insured is a procedural requirement itself, as opposed to a substantive obligation. While subrogation is a matter of substance rather than form, this aspect of subrogation is a matter of the procedure to be followed in the exercise of the substantive right of subrogation. The court noted however that:

"[t]he fact that Zurich has resorted to the third party procedure to put its subrogated claim on behalf of the plaintiffs in play in the action does not mean that Zurich is asserting the plaintiffs’ claim against Pizza Nova in Zurich’s own name. As I have earlier pointed out, rule 29.01 merely provides a mechanism whereby the defendant Zurich may ensure that an issue regarding which the third party should be bound is determined in the action; it is not necessary that that issue arise out of a claim whereby the defendant says the third party is or may be liable to the defendant. In my view, Zurich is entitled to resort to the third party rule in its own name in these circumstances."

As this case demonstrates, the right of an insurer to bring a subrogated action is derivative; that is, it merely a right to make such claim for damages as the insured himself could have made. For this reason, the general rule still holds in Canada that a subrogated action must be brought in the insured's name, rather than that of the insurer.

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Effective October 1, 2009, North Carolina's statute of repose for claims for defective products will be increased from six to twelve years for actions that accrue on or after October 1, 2009.  N .C .G .S. 1-46.1(a)(1) .  For actions that accrued prior to October 1, 2009, the former statue of six years after the date of initial purchase or consumption will apply. 

This will substantially and positively impact subrogation potential for defective product claims in North Carolina. Interestingly, the statute of repose for improvements to real property will remain six years from the later of the specific last act/omission giving rise to the cause of action or the date of substantial completion .   N.C.G.S.  1-50(a)(5)

It is key that in any claim you have that you are calculating both the statute of limitation and statute of repose periods.  Remember a statute of limitation begins to run from the date of the event or loss.  This is the length of time within which a legal cause of action or suit must be brought.  Whereas, as statute of repose may have begun to run months or even years before the event/loss.  A classic example would be a defective car which catches fire within the garage of a home.  In North Carolina, the statute of limitation for property damages based in tort is generally three years from the event.  However, the statute of repose for the product, in this case the car, will be calculated from the date of sale to the first purchaser.

Suit must be brought before the running of both the limitation and repose periods.

 It is entirely possible that the repose period may have run before the loss or will run shortly after the date of loss.  This was frequently the problem with product claims in North Carolina because of the short repose period of six years.  Now, for events that take place after October 1, 2009, a twelve year repose period will apply and more product claims can be brought as now products between 7-12 years in age will not automatically be excluded which would bar suit against the manufacturer.   In the example above, a claim that occurred prior to October 1, 2009, for a defective 11-year old vehicle is barred because the six year statute of repose still applies to claims before October 1, 2009.  If the fire had occurred today, October 1, 2009, the claim would not be barred because of the longer repose period of twelve years applies.  Note, you would still have to bring suit within one year of the loss (before the end of the 12th year), well before the running of the three year statute of limitation.  While the increase to 12 years for the product repose period is good news for those in the recovery business.

Keep in mind that North Carolina still has a fairly short six year statute of repose for improvements to real property.  So, if your house fire was due to defective original wiring in the garage and not the defective vehicle, you would have only a six year repose period that applies to your claim.  Like the example with the car, you might need to bring suit before the running of the limitation period if the six year repose period for the structure will run before the three year limitation period to bring suit expires."

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Subrogation cases often involve the pursuit of manufacturers in foreign countries.  Generally, service of process on those foreign manufacturers must be made pursuant to the requirements of the Hague Convention.  These requirements are time-consuming and costly, however, according to a recent California Appellate Court decision they may not always be necessary.

In Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct., the California Court of Appeal recently held that under certain circumstances a party may serve a foreign corporation by serving the corporation's American subsidiary.  The court considered factors including whether (1) there is ample regular contact between the local representative and the foreign defendant, (2) the likelihood that the local representative will notify the foreign defendant of the service, and (3) the overall relationship between the two companies.

The court concluded service on Yamaha-Japan was effectuated via service on Yamaha-American as this domestic entity was the “general manager in this state” and was the American face of the Japanese company.  Yamaha-America had (1) an exclusive arrangement to sell the foreign manufacturer's products, (2) provided warranty service and English owner manuals, (3) performed testing and marketing, and (4) received complaints about the manufacturer's products.  As a result, the court concluded that service of Yamaha-American was effective service for Yamaha-Japan under California law.  

Cases involving service of process on foreign manufacturers should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether service on its American subsidiary will suffice.  If so, it will save time and money in the pursuit of your subrogation recovery.

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