Subrogation & Recovery Law Blog : Insurance Subrogation Lawyer & Attorney : Cozen O'Connor Law Firm : Property Damage & Insurance Commentary

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) can be a useful tool that subrogation professionals can employ to effectively gather information to build a successful products liability claim. In cases where a loss is caused by a defective product, a simple FOIA request to the Consumer Products Safety Commission (“CPSC”) can produce a veritable treasure trove of documents of reported incidents involving a particular product. 

The CPSC tracks all complaints it receives about safety issues involving products sold in the United States. The complaints can come from a variety of sources, including local, state, or federal government agencies, as well as from consumers who contact the CPSC’s hotline. Depending on the number of incidents and the magnitude of the risk to consumers, the CPSC may launch an in-depth investigation (“IDI”) of a particular product.

Subrogation professionals investigating a potential products liability claim can utilize the CPSC’s website and FOIA requests to assist in determining whether there have been issues with a particular product. A FOIA request can produce incident reports and IDI reports relating to the product in question. To find out whether a product has been recalled, you can conduct a search at the CPSC website at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prerel.html. 

There are several ways to submit a FOIA request to the CPSC. The CPSC accepts submissions via mail, facsimile, and even by email. Here is the CPSC’s contact information for FOIA requests:

FOIA Requester Service Center
US Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway, Room 502
Bethesda, MD 20814
Tel. (301) 504-7923
Fax. (301) 504-0127
cpsc-foia@cpsc.gov

It is important to note that the individual making the request is responsible for the cost of reproducing the documents, although there are times when the CPSC will waive the fee. In any event, the cost pales in comparison to the cost of filing suit and obtaining the documents through discovery.  Additionally, the manufacturer of the product is afforded an opportunity to correct or challenge any of the requested information, and the manufacturer can block disclosure of incident reports where they can prove inaccuracies with supporting documentation.  There are also other rare instances where manufacturers can prevent disclose if the requested information contains trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information. To read more about FOIA requests and about what information is available, go to the CPSC’s Guide to Public Information at http://www.cpsc.gov/about/guide.html#Introduction. 

Finally, be on the lookout for a searchable database, which the CPSC is in the process of developing. The database was mandated by Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act  of 2008. It is anticipated that the database will be online at www.saferproducts.gov in March 2011.

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The Oregon Court of Appeals once again affirmed the viability of negligent construction claims while delivering another blow to the Economic Loss Doctrine.  In Cowan v. Nordyke, 232 Or.App. 384 (2009), plaintiff purchased a home from a Professional Home Designer (PHD).*  Of course, the home was not without problems, including water intrusion.  Plaintiff filed suit against the PHD claiming negligent design of the home and that the PHD's conduct fell below the standard of care for a reasonably prudent professional home designer.  The PHD’s motion for summary judgment was granted as Oregon does not recognize a tort for "professional negligence" by a PHD.  After attempts to amend the complaint to allege general negligence proved unsuccessful, plaintiff filed an appeal. 
While the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed that Oregon does not recognize "professional negligence" by a PHD, it reversed on the issue of allowing a claim against a PHD for general negligence. In reaching its decision, the Court explained that Oregon deviates from traditional negligence concepts of "duty, breach and causation."  In Oregon, liability rests on whether the defendant's conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff.  Foreseeability applies unless the parties invoke a "status, relationship, or particular standard of conduct that limits the defendant's duty."  Here, the PHD argued that the foreseeability standard did not apply because its duty to plaintiff was defined and limited by its status as an unlicensed contractor and an "owner builder," rather than a "builder-vendor."  The PHD further contended that there were adequate contractual protections for plaintiff and that it need only disclose that it built the house and to disclose known defects.  The court was not swayed and correctly held that that being an unlicensed contractor did not provide a shield to limit liability.  The Court reasoned that a jury can determine whether damages sustained by a plaintiff are reasonably foreseeable.  With regard to contractual protections and the disclosure of defects, the Court agreed that the required disclosure might provide sufficient protection for known defects.  However, the Court recognized that not all latent defects "come to light" while the builder occupies the home.  Therefore contractual disclosure is not an adequate substitute for holding a builder liable under the general negligence standard.

Oregon continues to recognize negligent construction claims grounded in general negligence.  As Oregon continues to recognize negligence in this context, it further erodes the Economic Loss Doctrine.  See also Bunnell v. Dalton Construction, Inc. (2006 (water damage to interior not economic loss) and Harris v. Suniga (2006) (damage to physical structures is not economic loss).
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* A Professional Building Designer specializes in designing light-frame buildings such as single family homes and agricultural buildings.  Unlike architects, Professional Building Designers are not legally required to pass exams or receive special licenses. 

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In Georgia, it is well known that actions for injury to real and personal property caused by any person furnishing the design or construction of an improvement to the property must be filed within eight (8) years after the substantial completion of the improvement. O.C.G.A. §9-3-51(a).  Further, an improvement to real property has been defined as a fixed alteration to the real property. Mullis v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982). The Courts have held that if a component is an essential and integral part of the improvement to which it belongs, then it is itself an improvement to real property.  Therefore, in the event a claimant files an action against a contractor, architect, or subcontractor to recover damages to its real property, for example, one would surmise that he or she has eight (8) years from the date the work was substantially completed to file the claim. That is not the case insomuch as in 1994, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in effect, shortened the time period to file a claim against a contractor to recover damages to real property to four (4) years.

In Hanna, et al. v. McWilliams, et al., 213 Ga. App. 648, 446 S.E.2d 741 (1994), a homeowner brought an action against a general contractor and subcontractor to recover damages to real and personal property caused by the negligent installation of a fireplace. The Hanna Court held that the fireplace constituted an integral part of the home and an improvement. As a result, the statute of repose applied. The Hanna Court also examined whether the homeowner had eight (8) years after the substantial completion of the fireplace to bring an action against the contractors, as outlined in the statute of repose, or whether the four (4) year statute of limitations barred the claim.  The Court held, as it pertains to damages to real property, that the Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the four (4) year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. §9-3-30 and the action accrued at the time of the substantial completion of the project.  

The holdings in Hannah provide that in cases involving damages to real property, the statute of repose and statute of limitations will run concurrently after the date of substantial completion. When the four (4) year limitation for tort actions has been reached, the claimant is barred from pursuing a claim to recover damages to its real property as a result of the defect in an improvement to its land. Keep in mind that the application of Hannah is different for damages to personal property as the discovery exception to the statute of limitations applies. 

Claimant beware! Make sure you examine the dates when the repair and/or improvement was made to determine if you have a viable claim.

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As was previously reported, New York Governor Paterson has signed a bill which purports to eliminate the alleged windfall of double recoveries to plaintiffs which were alleged to have resulted from the common-law Collateral Source Rule, which enabled collateral source payors, including subrogating insurers, to recover their losses as part of the damages claimed by injured insureds.  This bill does not impact property damage subrogation claims, which was made clear beyond peradventure by a memorandum prepared by one of the previous sponsoring committees.  The language of the prior sponsor's memo is as follows:

Collateral Source and Subrogation Changes: The various collateral source provisions of the CPLR were enacted to eliminate the common law collateral source rule, which prohibited tortfeasors from reducing their obligations to a plaintiff by the amount of benefits the plaintiff receives from other sources, such as insurance. The statute's purpose is to eliminate the windfall of double recoveries to plaintiffs which often resulted from the common law collateral source rule, while still ensuring that uncompensated losses are fully compensated. Notwithstanding the trend to eliminate the windfalls that result from the common law rule, and to safeguard public monies, presently all defendants except public employers may offset against awards for future costs or expenses any amounts that would with reasonable certainty be replaced or indemnified. This bill would ensure that public employers are treated the same as private employers in tort actions. New York City estimates that it would save $14.5 million annually from this reform.

At present, there is no statutory authority that addresses or limits the extent to which a benefit provider may claim contractual reimbursement or subrogation with respect to medical expenses it has paid pursuant to an insurance contract or other agreement. Likewise, there is no statutory authority that specifies whether or under what circumstances such a benefit provider may intervene as a party in a personal injury or wrongful death action. For example, in a medical malpractice action, a health insurer which has provided coverage to the plaintiff may demand reimbursement for its expenses, often unnecessarily prolonging cases, thwarting settlement talks and making cases more expensive to litigate. Thus, it has become important that a statutory framework be established to facilitate settlement of cases and reduce expenses for litigants. This bill would preclude a benefit provider to seek reimbursement or subrogation against a settling defendant for those benefits paid to or on behalf of plaintiff, unless specifically set forth by statute.  In doing so, this bill would make the savings to defendants more tangible, and allow cases to settle more quickly and without unnecessary expense. This provision of the bill would be applicable to actions for personal injury, medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, or wrongful death and would be inapplicable to the subrogation of property damage claims. (Emphasis added).

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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Procedural Rules Committee developed Recommendation 240 which would have amended Pa.R.C.P. 1020 to require that all claims arising from the same property loss be bought in a single action, even where there are different claimants with distinct damages.  This proposal would have overturned settled Pennsylvania appellate precedent.  Subrogation attorneys from Cozen O'Connor appeared before a committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association to voice opposition to this proposed rule change. It is of interest to note that the opposition we proffered on behalf of the subrogation community was echoed and expanded upon by representatives of the plaintiffs' personal injury bar, who also questioned the need for the proposed amendment.  All affected constituencies were united in their opposition to this unnecessary rule change, noting that there already are existing procedural mechanisms to allow parties to move for consolidation of related claims, or not, depending upon the circumstances of each case.

At this time, all reports we have received indicate that the Committee's proposal is being withdrawn.

We will continue to monitor carefully all aspects of this proposed amendment, and will report further as information becomes available.

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Where the subrogating insurer and insured both have recovery claims and are competing for a limited amount of available money from a defendant, issues arise as to who is entitled to recovery, and/or how the recovery should be divided. These issues fall within the realm of the “made whole rule”, which generally provides, that under certain circumstances (i.e. limited assets of a wrongdoing defendant, non participation of the subrogating insurer in recovery lawsuit), the insured is entitled to be “made whole” for uninsured damages from the wrongdoing defendant, before the subrogating carrier can recover from the insured (via a lien or policy provisions) or from the defendant who caused the injury.

In a recent California Supreme Court decision involving med pay reimbursement, 21^st Century Insurance Company v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal. 4^th 511, 213 P. 3d 972, an insured attempted to expand the scope of the made whole rule by including the insured’s attorney’s fees as part of her uninsured loss, thereby eliminating the recovery of the subrogating carrier.   

21^st Century’s insured was injured in an automobile accident. 21^st Century paid the insured $1,000 under the med pay provisions of its automobile policy. The insured hired an attorney and pursed a personal injury claim against the third party who caused the accident. The case settled for $6,000, which comprised her total damages. The insured’s attorney received a fee approximating $2,000, leaving a net recovery of $4,000. 21^st Century requested reimbursement of $1,000.  The insured argued that because her damages, including attorney’s fees, were $8,000, and her recovery was only $6,000, no reimbursement to 21^st Century was required. Thus, the question before the court was whether “made whole” included the attorney’s fees incurred by the insured.

After reviewing cases in other states and noting states are divided on the issue, the Court ruled in favor of 21^st Century, concluding that attorney’s fees should not be included as part of the insured’s damages for purposes of determining whether the insured has been made whole in med pay reimbursement cases.  Instead, the “common fund doctrine” allows the insured to reduce the amount of reimbursement to the insurer by a pro rata share of the insured’s costs and attorney’s fees. In that manner, both the insured and insurer share in the cost of recovery in proportion to their respective recoveries. The end result of the court’s decision allowed reimbursement to the insurer of $600, representing the insurer’s $1,000 payment, less its 1/6^th pro rata share of attorney’s fees and costs.

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New York Governor Paterson signed into law New York State Bill A40002, which amends CPLR 4545, New York's Collateral Source Rule.  The bill has many aspects, some of which relate to municipal health benefit plans which are not directly germane to subrogation concerns.  From a subrogation perspective, the bill both maintains existing restrictive language concerning subrogation rights, and further tightens the grounds upon which reimbursement may be obtained.

The pertinent section of the bill references "Any Action Brought To Recover Damages For Personal Injury, Injury To Property Or Wrongful Death…."   It then provides for "limitation of non-statutory reimbursement and subrogation claims in personal injury and wrongful death actions."  This section states that it shall be conclusively presumed that any settlement in a personal injury or wrongful death action does not include any compensation for the cost of healthcare services, loss of earnings or other economic loss to the extent they have been or will be reimbursed by a collateral source payer.  The only exception is when there is a right of reimbursement or subrogation that is statutorily established.

The Act does not purport to restrict rights of subrogation for property damage claims, notwithstanding the somewhat misleading reference to actions for "Injury To Property" in one of the headings.  Indeed, two separate memorandum prepared by bill sponsors explicitly stated that the bill is not applicable to property damage subrogation claims.  The bill was passed as a "program bill," with a truncated memorandum which did not contain this language, but the pertinent memoranda still comprise part of the relevant legislative history for this bill, to the extent any unfounded arguments are made regarding the intended application and scope of this bill.  We shortly will be posting one or both of the sponsor memos with this clear language.

Stay tuned for further developments regarding potential anti-subrogation legislation in other jurisdictions.

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The Economic Loss Doctrine may bar tort claims when a defective product causes injury only to the product itself and not to other property or persons. In many jurisdictions there are exceptions to the doctrine, including when the damage is caused by a “sudden calamitous event.”Recently, the Supreme Court of Tennessee considered the application of this exception.

In Lincoln General Ins. Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., a bus caught fire due to an allegedly defective engine. The fire did not cause personal injuries or property damage to anything other than the bus. The subrogating insurer argued that the economic loss doctrine should not bar a products liability claim because the harm was caused by a “sudden calamitous event.” The court rejected the exception, instead following a “bright line rule” completely barring tort claims when a product causes damage only to itself.  The court reasoned that certain products “expose a product owner to an unreasonable risk of injury during an abrupt and disastrous occurrence" while others "merely disappoint a product owner’s expectations.”  The court explained that it would be difficult for parties and courts to apply a rule that focuses on the degree of risk and the manner in which the product was damaged, as opposed to a rule that hinges on the harm a plaintiff actually sustains.

Despite Tennessee's reluctance to carve out an exception, many states have successfully modified the application of the Economic Loss Rule by:

1. Creating component part exceptions. (California)
2. Confining the doctrine to products liability or very similar situations. (Florida);
3. Statutorily providing for new home warranty laws against construction defects.(Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia);
4. Statutorily providing for notice and right to repair and associated actions (California, Nevada);
5. Finding that builders have a duty in tort to act without negligence in the construction of residences (Colorado, South Carolina), or
6. Recognizing exceptions, such as an independent duties (Utah, Colorado), special relationships or foreseeability of plaintiff (Alaska, Delaware, West Virginia).

The Economic Loss Doctrine varies in its application from state to state.  If you have a large loss involving a product, it is prudent to review your jurisdiction’s interpretation of the doctrine, and exceptions to the same, prior to embarking on recovery efforts.

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“Dangerous and generally a fruitless occupation.”- Justice Akenhead

No, Justice Akenhead was not talking about being a lawyer, but stating that it is inappropriate to rank possible causes of a fire in terms of probability in order to select the most probable. 

In Fosse Motor Engineers Ltd v Conde Nast (2008), Fosse, the owner of a warehouse, asserted negligence against its tenant and an employment agency that supplied workers in the building for that tenant. A fire occurred at the warehouse when only the workers and a security guard were present. Expert evidence could not identify which of several possible causes led to the fire. The possible causes were: a cigarette discarded by either Fosse’s employees or the agency workers; an electrical fault; or arson by an intruder. Fosse claimed the fire was caused by one of the agency workers carelessly discarding a cigarette or, if it was an intruder, because a door had been left open by the agency workers allowing the intruder access.

The Judge held that although the Court might eliminate all but one of the causes of the fire, it still had to decide that the remaining cause was the most probable. The judge accepted the evidence of the agency workers that the fire was not caused by their actions and discounted the electrical cause as being improbable. That left either someone working earlier or an intruder (entering before the agency workers). The Judge found that as it was not possible, on the balance of probabilities, to determine which of the two remaining feasible scenarios was the cause, Fosse had failed to prove its case.

What’s all the Fosse about?

Fosse provides a reminder that in England & Wales the burden rests upon the claimant to overcome the evidential burden. In some respects the fact that the Judge did not choose to decide between (what he regarded as) the remaining feasible causes was academic since, in either scenario, Fosse would not have been successful. However, the fact that the Judge chose not to decide may be useful in defending claims where the exact circumstances that gave rise to the allegation are unclear: It is therefore always worthwhile looking into causation issues with a critical eye. 

In Drake v Harbour (2008), the lack of proof of an exact cause did not prevent recovery. The claimant engaged the defendant electrician to rewire her home. She was away from the property during the work when a fire started in the loft where Harbour had been working. The Court of Appeal held that the fact that the claimant was unable to demonstrate the precise mechanism that led to the fire was not a bar to recovery; if a claimant proved that a defendant was negligent and a loss was caused that was of a kind likely to have resulted from such negligence, that would ordinarily be enough to infer that it was probably so caused. Further, as Harbour was suggesting that it was not his negligence that caused the fire, then it was his burden to suggest what the probable cause was, and to properly plead it.

Harbouring doubts?

Drake suggests that where negligence can be established you do not necessarily have to show the precise mechanism as an English Court might infer that it was the defendant's negligence that caused the loss; the onus then shifting to the defendant to prove that alternative causes are at least “as likely”.

Causation considerations
These two cases highlight the importance of considering the cogency of the factual (and expert) evidence in proceedings. Drake suggests that even if you don't know the precise mechanism, if you can show that the likely causes all would have emanated from the negligence of a specified person, that suffices. If an English Court can be satisfied that a party was negligent it may not always be necessary to show the most likely cause. In Fosse, though, because the causes may have had different culprits, and because negligence could not necessarily be shown, the causation hurdle could not be overcome.

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Article I, Section 19 of The California Constitution provides that just compensation be paid when private property is taken or damaged for public use.  *STOP*  Take a deep breath.  It is not as tough as it sounds.  In fact, after reading this blog you'll likely find yourself asking "Why haven't I used inverse condemnation as a cause of action in fire cases before?".

Insurance carriers have incurred more than a billion dollars in damages arising from the California wildfires over the past few years.  The causes of these fires include arson, discarded cigarettes and failed utility equipment owned or operated by government entities or privately owned public utility companies.  When the latter are to blame, rest assured that inverse condemnation is the preferred cause of action to champion your fire subrogation case.  It's both a shield and a sword against government entities and public utilities.

The Shield:      In California, government entities require an injured party to file a claim within six (6) months of an incident to preserve a cause of action for Dangerous Condition of Public Property.  Inverse condemnation does not require the filing of any claim form and has a three (3) years statute of limitations.  Even assuming you win the race to file a timely notice, you will still need to prove the public entity or utility had notice of the dangerous condition in order to prevail under a Dangerous Condition of Public Property cause of action.  Inverse Condemnation has no requirement to prove notice of the dangerous condition.

The Sword:  A plaintiff need only prove the necessary elements of the cause of action to prevail  - (1) a public entity or privately owned utility company (2) took/damaged (3) private property for (4) public use (5) without just compensation.  [Note: Flood/levee cases have some different requirements.].  A plaintiff does not need to prove (1) negligent conduct; (2) fault on the part of the government entity or public utility; (3) that the loss was foreseeable; or (4) how or why the loss even occurred.   Moreover, liability and causation are issues to be determined by a judge, not a jury, which eliminates potential bias against insurance companies.  As if this is not enough incentive, a plaintiff that prevails under an inverse condemnation cause of action is also entitled to recover attorneys'  fees and costs.

Inverse condemnation is a recognized cause of action in many jurisdictions, though its application varies from state to state.  Still, the next time you receive a fire loss in which a government entity or privately owned public utility company is a potential defendant, look to see if the elements of inverse condemnation are met.  If so, don't be afraid to wield the sword and reap the benefits.

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In Canada, the right of subrogation is a product of the common law, although it may be modified by statute or contract. Unlike in the United States, Canadian common law provides that an insurer may sue only in the name of the insured in relation to a subrogated claim .That rationale has its roots in the need to provide a process by which the insurer would be able to exercise its subrogated rights. Historically, insureds were required to take all steps within their power to reduce a loss for which they had received indemnity, including exercising legal remedies against third parties. Since those remedies were personal to the insured, however, they could only be exercised in the name of the insured as a matter of procedural law. The common law did not provide a method whereby a person could be compelled to commence an action against another; therefore insurers had to apply to the Chancery Court to compel an insured to allow his or her name to be used for legal proceedings against third persons in order to reduce the loss.

The tenet still holds true today, and is illustrated by an exception to the rule discussed in the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Freudmann-Cohen v. Tran, 2004 CanLII 34765 (Ont. C.A.) . In Freudmann-Cohen, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when her car was struck by another vehicle. Since the driver of the offending vehicle was underinsured, the plaintiff asserted a claim under her own automobile insurer for underinsured motorist coverage. Her insurer, Zurich, subsequently learned that the defendant had been delivering pizza for Pizza Nova franchise at the time of the accident and that the franchisee had insurance coverage. It then issued a third party claim in its own name against the defendant pursuant to Rule 29.01 of Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that: "A defendant may commence a third party claim against any person who is not a party to the action and who...should be bound by the determination of an issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant." Zurich argued that Rule 29.01 constitutes a procedural scheme, with the force of regulation, which overrides the normal subrogation principle requiring an insurer claiming a subrogated right to sue in the name of the insured in circumstances such as these.

The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed, and held that the subrogation principle obliging the insurer to sue in the name of the insured is a procedural requirement itself, as opposed to a substantive obligation. While subrogation is a matter of substance rather than form, this aspect of subrogation is a matter of the procedure to be followed in the exercise of the substantive right of subrogation. The court noted however that:

"[t]he fact that Zurich has resorted to the third party procedure to put its subrogated claim on behalf of the plaintiffs in play in the action does not mean that Zurich is asserting the plaintiffs’ claim against Pizza Nova in Zurich’s own name. As I have earlier pointed out, rule 29.01 merely provides a mechanism whereby the defendant Zurich may ensure that an issue regarding which the third party should be bound is determined in the action; it is not necessary that that issue arise out of a claim whereby the defendant says the third party is or may be liable to the defendant. In my view, Zurich is entitled to resort to the third party rule in its own name in these circumstances."

As this case demonstrates, the right of an insurer to bring a subrogated action is derivative; that is, it merely a right to make such claim for damages as the insured himself could have made. For this reason, the general rule still holds in Canada that a subrogated action must be brought in the insured's name, rather than that of the insurer.

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Unlike in the United States, one of the most frustrating problems for subrogators in England is that they are not able to obtain a third party’s insurance policy in order to ascertain how deep their opponents pockets are before pursuing a recovery action. 

This tactical advantage was effectively nailed closed (for now) following the court’s decision in the West London Pipeline and Storage Limited v. Total UK Limited (2008).  In that case, Total was seeking contribution from a third party (TAV) following the largest peace time explosion in Europe at the Buncefield oil depot in 2006.  Relying on the court’s controversial decision in Harcourt –v- Griffin (2007), Total made an application to the court under CPR Part 18 for information and the disclosure of TAV’s insurance information.  Total argued that the information was relevant to the issues in dispute and necessary for the efficient management of the case. 

Unfortunately for subrogators, TAV successfully argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to order disclosure of its insurance information, as it was not relevant to any issue in the case.  Agreeing with TAV, the court took the view that although they understood the claimant’s desire to know whether a Defendant is worth suing, the court was also keen to avoid the promotion of “deep pocket” or “speculative” litigation before English courts.   

Although the Total decision has been adopted by most courts in England, the argument that an insurance policy is a private matter between the insured and insurers has not extended to After-The-Event (“ATE”) insurance policies.  These are specific policies which some claimants take out to combat the loser pays rule, which is embedded in English litigation.  Claimants use ATE policies to cover their liability to pay a Defendant’s legal fees and disbursements, if their case is unsuccessful.   In the recent decision of Barr & Oths –v- Biff Waste Services Ltd [2009], the court took the view that such insurance policies are disclosable.  Among other things, the court held that there was a difference between liability insurance, which may have been in place for many years before the event giving rise to the litigation, and an ATE insurance policy that was probably taken out for the sole purpose of allowing a claimant to pursue litigation, which would otherwise not be possible.  As an ATE policy is a vital component to the litigation itself, its disclosure can be distinguished from the court’s decision in the Total case.

While the theory surrounding both decisions may seem sound, one cannot help but feel that just as a Defendant in England does not want to defend a claim for fear of being unable to recover its costs, a claimant does not want to obtain an empty judgement.  Surely as the “cards on the table” approach is the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules, wouldn’t it be in all parties interest to save time and costs by knowing where they stand from the outset of any case?

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Measure of Damages

A critical part of any subrogation analysis is the determination of what damages are legally recoverable from a potentially liable third party. Unique to equine claims, the owner of the horse will often choose to insure the horse for less than its fair market value to avoid higher premiums. For this reason, the insured value rarely, if ever, equates to what is legally recoverable. In most jurisdictions, the fair market value of the horse is the proper measure of damages. To prove fair market value at trial, there must be a well supported opinion given by a qualified expert in the field. Although a third party may be liable for injuring the horse and rendering it incapable of performing its intended purpose, the horse may still have a significant residual value as a breeding horse or performing a new purpose. That residual value will likely be subtracted from the overall damages recoverable through litigation. In today’s climate of frequent expert challenges, choosing the right expert who can properly evaluate these issues is essential.

In addition to seeking the fair market value of the horse, an owner often asks whether he or she may seek pain and suffering or emotional distress damages for their loss. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, these types of damages are not recoverable because there is no physical manifestation of an injury to the policy holder. The owner will be limited to economic damages, which may include a claim for business interruption, loss of future breeding rights or loss of future value. 

First Dollar Out

With many horses being underinsured, first dollar out questions often arise in equine subrogation claims. It is important to be aware of the policy language and any first dollar out rules in your jurisdiction. In addition, there is no penalty for underinsuring a horse.   A proration agreement is one way to effectively handle what could be a sticky situation with the insured after litigation begins.  Such an agreement also provides a platform for the carrier and the policy holder to discuss the actual recoverable damages before litigation ensues. Having these discussions up front helps to manage the sometimes unreasonable expectations of the policy holder who is devastated by the loss of their equine companion. 

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In recent years, technology and the internet have fostered a new trend in social media with websites such as Youtube, Facebook, and Twitter.  This undeniably stems from the desire for instant information.  How can technology and the internet assist in maximizing subrogation cases?  Consider these examples:

Youtube/Online Video:  Recently I received a new fire loss days after the fire occurred.  I began searching online for information and came across multiple Youtube videos of the fire still burning.  Some of the videos were taken from a helicopter by a major news organization and others were local/online reporters and bystanders documenting the fire spread.  One video even included an interview with the local fire department chief discussing the status of the fire.  These videos can be used to assist fire cause and origin investigators in their evaluation of where the fire started, how it spread and even identifying witnesses. 

E-Mailing Notice Letters:  The process of placing a potential defendant on notice of a new loss, and receiving a response, can often take weeks.  However, most companies have websites with e-mail contact information.  By utilizing their e-mail addresses, you can ensure (1) reasonable notice and (2) faster notification to liability carriers.  Further, you can activate the "Return Receipt" feature on your email to verify that the notice was actually received.  

Video-Conferencing:  Whether you are conducting a roundtable conference with subrogation counsel, interviewing an insured or even listening to a deposition, a simple telephone call may not always provide all of the details.  If a picture is worth a thousand words then video-conferencing is the equivalent of a dictionary.  Video-conferencing allows you to assess facial expressions and body language.  In essence, it puts you in the room.  Video-conferencing is readily available in most law firms and there are many inexpensive alternatives available, such as Skype which allows video calls over the internet to other Skype users. 

These are just a few examples of how technology and the internet can assist in maximizing subrogation recoveries. These tools should be utilized for effective and efficient handling of subrogation losses.

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Subrogation cases often involve the pursuit of manufacturers in foreign countries.  Generally, service of process on those foreign manufacturers must be made pursuant to the requirements of the Hague Convention.  These requirements are time-consuming and costly, however, according to a recent California Appellate Court decision they may not always be necessary.

In Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct., the California Court of Appeal recently held that under certain circumstances a party may serve a foreign corporation by serving the corporation's American subsidiary.  The court considered factors including whether (1) there is ample regular contact between the local representative and the foreign defendant, (2) the likelihood that the local representative will notify the foreign defendant of the service, and (3) the overall relationship between the two companies.

The court concluded service on Yamaha-Japan was effectuated via service on Yamaha-American as this domestic entity was the “general manager in this state” and was the American face of the Japanese company.  Yamaha-America had (1) an exclusive arrangement to sell the foreign manufacturer's products, (2) provided warranty service and English owner manuals, (3) performed testing and marketing, and (4) received complaints about the manufacturer's products.  As a result, the court concluded that service of Yamaha-American was effective service for Yamaha-Japan under California law.  

Cases involving service of process on foreign manufacturers should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether service on its American subsidiary will suffice.  If so, it will save time and money in the pursuit of your subrogation recovery.

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One of the first things to do upon receipt of a new subrogation loss involving a product is to check to see if there are any recalls of that product.  Ultimately, if your cause and origin investigator determines the product is the cause of the loss, the recall can greatly strengthen your subrogation case.  It provides effective cross-examination of the manufacturer’s employees and experts, as well as substantial leverage in settlement discussions. 

The United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) regularly advises the public of product recalls and is an excellent resource.  Recently, the CPSC issued the following product recalls which may be relevant to future subrogation claims:

On July 30, 2008, Frigidaire announced a voluntary recall of clothes washers due to a fire hazard.  An internal defect in the washers’ drain pump case overheats and presents a fire hazard.  This recall involves several models within the six brands manufactured by Frigidaire which were sold nationwide between February 2009 and May 2009.  The Frigidaire brands subject to this recall include Crosley, Frigidaire, Kelvinator, Kenmore, Wascomat and White-Westinghouse. 

On July 21, 2009, Fiesta Gas Grills announced a voluntary recall of its Blue Ember grills, which are fueled by propane.  These gas grills are manufactured by Unisplendor Corporation and Keesung Corporation, both in China. Fiesta is the national importer.  The hose of the gas tank can get too close to the firebox, exposing it to heat and creating a fire hazard. The grills were sold nationwide between November 2006 and June 2007 and in Canada between November 2006 and May 2009. 

On August 11, 2009, Griffin International issued a voluntary recall on Wii battery recharge stations.  Psyclone Essentials and React Wii 4-dock battery recharge stations are recalled due to a fire hazard. The battery pack can overheat, creating a fire hazard. The battery packs subject to this recall were sold at Target, Toys R Us and on amazon.com from January 2008 to July 2009.

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 Just like property damage claims, it is vital to hire the right experts and conduct a thorough and timely investigation. But unlike a typical property damage claim, with equine mortality claims it is often impractical and difficult to maintain the deceased horse for days or weeks to allow for all interested parties to retain experts and examine the horse. Many times, the board of health will not allow the horse to be retained. Nonetheless, immediate notice should be given in writing to any potentially responsible third parties. DNA samples should be collected and preserved to prove that the deceased horse is in fact the insured horse. If it is believed that a third party caused the death, it is also recommended that a full post mortem examination be conducted at either a university or a diagnostic laboratory in order to conclusively establish the cause of death. Photographic documentation and the appropriate records from an equine veterinarian are also helpful in combating any claims of spoliation.

In an equine injury situation, a veterinary expert will be necessary to causally connect the potential defendant’s conduct to the injury. Similar to a personal injury case, the right medical experts and records are needed to support such a claim. Notice to responsible third parties should be given immediately, and the injury should be properly documented with photographs, x-rays, blood tests, or the like. Taking things a step further, the subrogation professional may wish to consult with the veterinarian before a report is finalized to make sure the report is thorough, admissible at trial, and easily understood by an opposing adjuster, judge or jury.

Consideration should also be given to whether the treating veterinarian is qualified to serve as a litigation consultant and testify at trial. Many veterinarians, like medical doctors, may be hesitant to testify against others in their industry. When there is a potential malpractice claim against a veterinarian, this issue should be addressed up front with the treating veterinarian. If a new expert is needed, it is best to give him or her an opportunity to examine the horse in question as close as possible to the time of the injury. Often times the insurance company will hire a separate veterinarian to avoid any conflict of interest for the insured’s veterinarian, which gives the subrogation professional a choice of experts.

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The Rules of the Road have changed, literally, with the bankruptcy filings of Chrysler and GM. Their restructurings have moved through the bankruptcy court at a dizzying pace.  The sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to Fiat was approved in June, and in mid-July, a judge approved the sale of GM's most-valuable assets to a new company, majority owned by the federal government.  These reorganizations are structured as asset sales to new entities "free and clear" of tort claims arising from vehicles manufactured and sold pre-bankruptcy.

Through this process, the automakers are eliminating thousands of dealers and leaving tort claimants to recover just pennies on the dollar through the bankruptcy court because Chrysler and GM for all intents and purposes were self-insured for products defect claims.

Chrysler already has obtained bankruptcy court approval of its "free and clear" sale that purports to prohibit the assertion of all current and future claims involving a vehicle it sold pre-bankruptcy against "new" Chrysler.  GM’s treatment of tort claims is somewhat different. Bowing to political pressure, "new" GM has agreed that it would accept liability for all claims involving GM cars that were sold prebankruptcy, so long as the accident occurred after the June 1, 2009 filing of GM’s bankruptcy petition. As with Chrysler, however, claims arising from pre-bankruptcy accidents would still get paid in nearly-worthless "bankruptcy dollars." 

The terms of the sale leave a large group of tort claimants and insurer subrogees largely out of luck in pursuing claims against Chrysler and GM.  While claims which involve cars sold pre-bankruptcy can still be brought against "new" GM if the accident occurred after the June 1 filing of the bankruptcy petition, insurers will find that most other subrogation claims, like those of the tort claimants, will be relegated to the bankruptcy court to be processed as nearly-worthless, unsecured bankruptcy claims.

While "new" GM has accepted some liability for these types of claims, "new" Chrysler has not.  Thus, it is likely that despite the terms of the bankruptcy court order which prohibits the assertion of current and future claims against Chrysler, future claimants will attempt to assert successor liability claims against "new" Chrysler.  In addition to challenging this portion of the bankruptcy court's order in Chrysler, many of these claimants will seek other sources of recovery, such as dealers and suppliers; potentially exposing their insurers to risks they did not foresee underwriting.

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The recent tragedy in Florida involving the sudden and untimely death of twenty-one polo ponies raises issues about equine subrogation possibilities. In that matter, a supplement is suspected in the death of polo horses. Because a horse cannot be “preserved” for inspection as with typical property losses, particular attention must be paid up front to protect any subrogation claim. This thread will routinely provide helpful tips for the adjuster and subrogation professional with regard to equine claims.

Theories of Equine Law Recovery

There are many potential third parties to look to for a recovery in an equine loss. If the horse is injured or killed, the question is what caused the injury or death. Assuming the stable owner is not the owner of the horse, the stable owner may be a potential target. If the barn or the grounds presented a dangerous condition that caused the injury or death, a premises liability case may exist. Before going too far down this road, the boarding agreement must be obtained and examined for any waivers of liability or waivers of subrogation. The stable will often carry a care, custody and control policy, or “CCC policy,” that covers any horses that are injured while in the care of the stable. Be sure to check policy limits, however, because some policies only pay a limited amount per horse and may have a low aggregated limit.

Another potential target is the treating veterinarian. If the treating veterinarian fails to properly treat or diagnose a condition that leads to the deterioration of that condition and permanent lameness or injury, a subrogation claim may be viable. Likewise, trainers may also be potential targets for failing to recognize a problem or failing to timely seek veterinary assistance. If the trainer does not address an injury, or disregards a veterinarian’s advice, the horse could suffer additional injury or permanent lameness if pushed to exercise and work. This is properly the subject of expert testimony—thus it is critical to have an consulting veterinarian or trainer to advise whether treating veterinarian and/or the trainer failed to meet the standard of care which was the proximate cause of the injury. 

Product manufacturers, including drug companies, are another potential target. There can be any number of ways a defective product could kill or injure a horse - from a defective heater causing a barn fire, to a horse-trailer tire blowing out and causing an accident. In a fire situation, local codes should be reviewed to determine whether any fire suppression system should have been installed and maintained by the stable manager. Thinking creatively about possible theories of recovery in the early stages is invaluable to know what parties to place on notice and what evidence and documentation should be retained.

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