Subrogation & Recovery Law Blog : Insurance Subrogation Lawyer & Attorney : Cozen O'Connor Law Firm : Property Damage & Insurance Commentary

California’s Electronic Discovery Act (the “Act”) obligates counsel to consider any issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored information” at the mandatory initial meet and confer. By passing the Act, the California Legislature recognized that the digital revolution has changed the way businesses, clients, consumers, and professionals manage, access, and save documents and information. The office of today bears little resemblance to the typewriters, dictaphones, and adding machines commonly seen throughout the workplace in the 1960’s and depicted on AMC’s television series Mad Men. These antiquated machines have been replaced by inexpensive personal computers that complete the tasks and manage the information of multiple machines in a fraction of the time. The use and storage of digital information poses new responsibilities and challenges for attorneys in protecting and promoting their clients’ interests.

Electronically stored information (“ESI”) creates new duties and responsibilities for attorneys. California’s Rules of Professional Conduct require every attorney to apply the diligence, learning and skill reasonably necessary for the performance of their services. The pervasive use and reliance on electronic data demands that attorneys be computer literate to fulfill this duty and understand the role electronic data and documents play in litigation. In addition, the California Supreme Court has made it clear that lawyers must instruct their clients to preserve and maintain any potentially relevant evidence. In the modern era, a large amount of relevant evidence comes in the form of ESI. ESI can be a separate and distinct category of information from what is contained in an electronic document’s paper counterpart. For example, many electronic documents contain “metadata,” which is commonly defined as “data about data.” More specifically, metadata is “information describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.” As an illustration, if an attorney produces an electronic document, but erases the metadata, it is like copying only the front of a paper document that has print on both sides. A failure to understand metadata risks the loss of valuable information.

Because of ESI, attorneys face new challenges in conducting and managing discovery for their clients.   Litigators must consider the discovery of ESI to anticipate the time necessary to complete discovery and establish a plan for obtaining all relevant information. A few of the issues or questions that must be considered in discovering relevant ESI include: the number of computers, number of users, programs used (including proprietary software), policies on storing ESI, remote data storage, the names of network administrators, and file formats to request (i.e., doc, docx, xls, pdf, tif, etc.). Also, prudence may require the attendance of an information technology (“IT”) expert at the meet and confer. Employing the help of IT experts will assist those who are less computer-savvy in locating and securing relevant ESI. Depending on the amount of ESI, it may be helpful to depose a member of the opposing party’s IT staff as a person most knowledgeable. 

Well-orchestrated electronic discovery has many benefits in litigation. As discussed above, electronic documents can provide valuable details (metadata) about a particular electronic document like who, when, and where that document was created. Moreover, reviewing electronic documents can increase efficiency because the information can be searched for key terms, phrases, and issues. But if a production request doesn’t specify whether the document should be produced in electronic or paper form, the producing party can choose. Federal courts have held that acceptance of documents in paper form satisfies the production obligation and the accepting party has waived any objection to the form of the document produced. Therefore, the electronic version and any metadata contained within the document will be lost.

The California Legislature has recognized the important and ubiquitous nature of ESI in modern litigation. The effective litigator will also observe its importance and develop a strategy for preserving and discovering ESI.

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The flammability of approved cigarettes is of great importance to insurers as significant property damage occurs each year from carelessly discarded smoking materials.  According to NFPA's 2008 article U.S Smoking-Material Fire Problem, in 2006 over $606 million dollars of property damage occurred due to smoking materials.   In order to try and reduce the number of fires related to cigarettes, most states require that cigarettes meet the testing procedures outlined in the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International's E2187, Standard Test Method for Measuring the Ignition Strength of Cigarettes.  Cigarettes that comply with this testing standard are supposedly safer --- less likely to cause a fire than cigarettes that do not comply with this standard.  The hope was that ASTM E2187 compliant cigarettes would self-extinguish thereby reducing the number of smoking material related fires.

Unfortunately, recent ignition tests by Fire Findings shows little to no difference between ASTM E2187 approved cigarettes and traditional, non-ASTM E2187 cigarettes.  See, Fire Findings, Vol.18, No.1 (Winter 2010).  Fire Findings tested the propensity for ASTM E2187 cigarettes to ignite trash, dry potting soil and peat moss, and gasoline.  The results of these tests were similar to the results of their previous tests of traditional cigarettes.  Fire Findings concluded that both types of cigarettes, ASTM E2187 approved and non-approved, can ignite similar materials in real world situations.   The next time your get a fire loss involving a cigarette, don't be so quick to discard it simply because the cigarette met the ASTM E2187 standard. 

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Colorado's legislature is considering passing a bill that would limit subrogation in personal injury cases.  House Bill 10-1186 is aimed at situations where the insured would not be made whole if the insurer was allowed to recover its payments through subrogation.  In other words, if there is a limited pool of money to go around, the insured needs to be fully compensated before the insurer can recover its payments.  If the bill is passed into law, an insurer would be prohibited from bringing a direct subrogation action against a third party if the insured was not fully compensated for his or her damages by the policy.  

As drafted, the proposed bill seems only to apply to personal injury and health care cases and does not include property damage cases.  Specifically, the bill defines an injured party in pertinent part as "a person who has sustained bodily injury as the result of the act or omission of a third party."  If passed, the bill would prohibit an insurer from recovering payments, either directly or from the insured, if the insured has not been fully compensated for his personal injuries. 

The bill was introduced in January 2010 and is currently with the Judiciary Committee.  Cozen O'Connor attorneys, along with lobbyists for other interested parties, recently met with the sponsors of the bill seeking modifications to the proposed language specifying that the bill only deals with health care matters.  The bill's future can be monitored at this blog or the Colorado legislature's website.

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Toyota’s unprecedented recall of some 8.1 million vehicles will impact consumers, businesses, and their insurance carriers all over the country.  Since 1999, an estimated 2,000 complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles have been reported to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ["NHTSA"].  On February 9, 2010, Toyota issued a global recall of its 2010 Prius hybrid after over 100 complaints of “delayed brake performance” were filed with the NHTSA.   [See, timeline of recalls.]

Damages to persons and property as a result of these apparent defects will result in numerous insurance claims scattered throughout the fifty states.  The breadth of this recall presents significant subrogation and recovery potential.  But the potential complexity and fragmentation of claims raises obstacles to efficiently and effectively prosecuting many separate cases. 

Mutual cooperation agreements allow carriers to maximize recovery while minimizing and sharing expenses.  Cooperation allows for the appointment of review masters and experts to determine liability and damages related to prior, existing, and future claims.  These claims may include payments to insureds for property damage, personal injury, worker’s compensation benefits, business interruption, and loss of goodwill.

It is anticipated that the insurance industry will act quickly and expediently to review past and existing claims related to matters that involve Toyota vehicles.  Given the expanse of the recall effort by the automaker and the efforts directed by Toyota to rectify manufacturing and design defects, it is possible that the automaker will also seek a forum for cost effective and expedient resolution of claims related to the defective vehicles. 

The availability of multi-district litigation modules and mutual cooperation agreements combined with the efforts of the automaker will effectively endow both the insurance industry and the automaker with a viable alternative to multiple forum litigation.

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The Oregon Court of Appeals once again affirmed the viability of negligent construction claims while delivering another blow to the Economic Loss Doctrine.  In Cowan v. Nordyke, 232 Or.App. 384 (2009), plaintiff purchased a home from a Professional Home Designer (PHD).*  Of course, the home was not without problems, including water intrusion.  Plaintiff filed suit against the PHD claiming negligent design of the home and that the PHD's conduct fell below the standard of care for a reasonably prudent professional home designer.  The PHD’s motion for summary judgment was granted as Oregon does not recognize a tort for "professional negligence" by a PHD.  After attempts to amend the complaint to allege general negligence proved unsuccessful, plaintiff filed an appeal. 
While the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed that Oregon does not recognize "professional negligence" by a PHD, it reversed on the issue of allowing a claim against a PHD for general negligence. In reaching its decision, the Court explained that Oregon deviates from traditional negligence concepts of "duty, breach and causation."  In Oregon, liability rests on whether the defendant's conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff.  Foreseeability applies unless the parties invoke a "status, relationship, or particular standard of conduct that limits the defendant's duty."  Here, the PHD argued that the foreseeability standard did not apply because its duty to plaintiff was defined and limited by its status as an unlicensed contractor and an "owner builder," rather than a "builder-vendor."  The PHD further contended that there were adequate contractual protections for plaintiff and that it need only disclose that it built the house and to disclose known defects.  The court was not swayed and correctly held that that being an unlicensed contractor did not provide a shield to limit liability.  The Court reasoned that a jury can determine whether damages sustained by a plaintiff are reasonably foreseeable.  With regard to contractual protections and the disclosure of defects, the Court agreed that the required disclosure might provide sufficient protection for known defects.  However, the Court recognized that not all latent defects "come to light" while the builder occupies the home.  Therefore contractual disclosure is not an adequate substitute for holding a builder liable under the general negligence standard.

Oregon continues to recognize negligent construction claims grounded in general negligence.  As Oregon continues to recognize negligence in this context, it further erodes the Economic Loss Doctrine.  See also Bunnell v. Dalton Construction, Inc. (2006 (water damage to interior not economic loss) and Harris v. Suniga (2006) (damage to physical structures is not economic loss).
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* A Professional Building Designer specializes in designing light-frame buildings such as single family homes and agricultural buildings.  Unlike architects, Professional Building Designers are not legally required to pass exams or receive special licenses. 

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The California Supreme Court in the case of Randall v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 2009 DJD 16727 upheld the attorney-client privilege set forth in Evidence Code §954. The privilege attaches to any legal advice given in the course of an attorney-client relationship, regardless if the communication contains unprivileged material.

Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”), retained counsel to provide legal advice regarding whether certain Costco warehouse managers in California were exempt from California’s wage and overtime laws. Counsel undertook this assignment and provided an opinion letter to Costco on the issue.

Several years later, Costco employees filed a class action against Costco, claiming that from 1999 through 2001, Costco had misclassified some of its managers as “exempt” employees and therefore had failed to pay them the overtime wages they were due as non-exempt employees. During the course of the litigation, plaintiffs sought to compel discovery of the opinion letter prepared by Costco’s counsel. Costco objected on the grounds that the letter was subject to the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. Plaintiffs disagreed, arguing that the letter contained unprivileged matter and that Costco had placed the contents of the letter in issue, thereby waiving the privilege.

The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege attached to the letter in its entirety, irrespective of the letter’s content. Further, Evidence Code §915 prohibits disclosure of the information claimed to be privileged as a confidential communication between attorney and client “in order to rule on the claim of privilege.” In addition, the Court found that a party seeking relief from a discovery order that wrongfully invades the attorney-client relationship need not also establish that its case will be harmed by disclosure of the evidence.

The holding bolsters a subrogating carrier's argument that correspondence from its counsel which includes facts and opinions about a loss, recovery potential, site inspections and conversations with witnesses are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

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In Fireman’s Insurance Company v. Fire-Free Chimney Sweeps, Inc.,[1] the Court permitted a chimney sweep to pursue a contribution claim against the unit owner whose actions caused or contributed the fire. The chimney sweep, a defendant in the related subrogation action bought by the condominium association's insurer, filed a contribution claim against the unit owner where the fire started. The unit owner argued that he could not be directly liable to the condominium association or any of the individual unit owners pursuant to provisions in the condominium documents and his status as an additional insured under the condominium association’s policy. Therefore, he claimed that he could not be liable for contribution. However, the Court concluded that since the chimney sweep was a stranger to the contract documents, they were not a basis to restrict the chimney sweep’s right of contribution pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor’s Act. The Court noted that the proper question was not whether the chimney sweep and the unit owner were jointly and severally liable to the association and its insurer but, rather, whether they each performed some act that injured the association itself. 

The decision confirms that in proper circumstances a party protected by a waiver of subrogation may still be liable for damages caused by its negligent acts via a contribution cause of action.

[1] This opinion is yet unpublished. It is identified as Delaware Civil Action No. 07C-06-287-JOH

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Cozen O’Connor attorneys successfully argued in the Delaware Superior Court that the adoption of a National Fire Protection Association standard by an administrative agency defined the standard of care for work performed by a chimney sweep. The Court accepted the argument advanced on behalf of a subrogating insurance carrier for a condominium association that a chimney sweep hired by the association to “clean and inspect” chimney flues was required to perform a full Level 1 inspection of the entire chimney and fireplace systems pursuant to NFPA 211. 

In Fireman’s Insurance Company v. Fire-Free Chimney Sweeps, Inc.,[1] the Court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a chimney sweep company. It claimed that its contract with a condominium association to “clean and inspect” chimneys and flues for the individual fireplaces in the condominium complex did not create any duty on the part of the chimney sweep to inspect the fireplaces connected to the chimneys. The Court found that NFPA 211, the standard relied upon by the plaintiff, required the chimney sweep to perform a full “Level 1” inspection which involves an evaluation of the chimney, flue and all appliances, including the fireplaces, that were attached to the chimney. 

The chimney sweep was hired by the association to clean and inspect the chimneys that were utilized by the 294 unit owners in the condominium complex. NFPA 211 mandates cleaning of chimneys and flues, including the evaluation of the appliance which is attached to the chimney, in order to insure that the entire system is safe and operational. One of the unit owners had replaced the original fireplace doors with an after-market set of doors which effectively blocked the flow of air around the prefabricated fireplace. This prevented the fireplace from properly cooling while it was in operation and resulted in the ignition of combustible wood members surrounding the fireplace. The after-market doors had been installed by this unit owner prior to the time that the chimney sweep company performed its cleaning and inspection. 

Plaintiff argued that had a full and complete Level 1 inspection been performed, the chimney sweep would have detected the fire hazard created by the after-market doors and should have provided warnings to the unit owner and condominium complex that the doors should be replaced in order to prevent fires.  The chimney sweep argued that its duty was limited to properly cleaning  and inspecting the flues. It asserted that since it had no access to the individual units it could not be responsible for the condition of the fireplaces in those units that it did not access. It did offer to inspect individual unit owner’s fireplaces for an additional charge of $40. Only a few of the unit owners availed themselves of this offer. 

The Court concluded that once a chimney sweep undertakes an inspection encompassed within the NFPA 211 standard, it has an absolute obligation to perform a full Level 1 inspection consistent with the standard and anything less would constitute negligence and negligence per se.  The court stressed code compliance as NFPA 211 is a standard intended to protect life and property from the risk of fires and explosions.  The Court essentially required a contractor like a chimney sweep to turn down a contract if it cannot carry out the steps in an adopted safety code, even if full compliance means mandating access to the private property of third parties.

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With a global economy more and more products are being shipped to the United States from foreign countries daily.  When these products fail, it is expensive and time consuming to seek recovery from the foreign manufacturer.  But before throwing out your products claim, look at your state's laws on pursuing those entities in the chain of distribution of the product.  For example, distributors usually coordinate the sale of the product from the manufacturer to the seller and many times never even touch the product.  Despite their limited role of organizing the transfer of the goods, their liability can be unlimited in some circumstances.

In Texas, if you establish that the manufacturer of the product is insolvent or not subject to the jurisdiction of the court then the distributor can be held fully liable for the damages caused by the product as though they were, in fact, the manufacturer.  See Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 82.003.  Many distributors try to insulate themselves from liability in Texas by pleading the manufacturer is a "responsible third party" under Section 33.004 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code.  This type of plea allows the distributor to put the manufacturer's name on the jury charge when the manufacturer is not a party to the litigation so the jury can then decide the percentage of responsibility between the manufacturer and the distributor.  Logically, jurors are going to put the majority of responsibility on the manufacturer who made the product as opposed to the distributor who may never have even touched the product.  Don't be fooled by this bit of legal maneuvering by a distributor.  The "responsible third party" statute only applies when both parties are negligent.  Under Section 82.003, the distributor can be held liable for the damages associated with the defective product without any negligence on the part of the distributor.  Since the distributor's responsibility for the product arises from the statutorily imposed guidelines of Section 82.003 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code and not from any negligent act it did or failed to do, the distributor cannot escape liability by trying to push a percentage of fault onto the manufacturer under Section 33.004. 

Each state has its own laws regarding the liability of distributors and those should be reviewed before closing a claim for a defective product manufactured overseas.

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